It is now commonly accepted that democratic elections with increased female participation and representation is an essential element of peacebuilding in postconflict societies. Yet, women are not a monolithic group and their needs are not homogeneous. This is especially the case in post-conflict societies marked by longstanding ethno-national antagonisms, where issues surrounding female unity and women's political participation are often considered secondary to resolving the national identity question. Using data from the 2015 Northern Ireland Election Survey, this paper examines female differences in electoral turnout between the two main religious groupings -Protestant and Catholic -in Northern Ireland. The results suggest the existence of a significant religious gap in electoral turnout among women, with Catholic women been significantly more likely to vote than Protestant women.
Introduction
Political participation and electoral turnout are considered the life blood of a healthy democracy. This is particularly the case in transitional societies where the participation of citizens in elections is viewed an indispensable tool not only for the confirmation of the new political order and its leaders but also for the development of democratic politics. As a number of commentators point out, not only are elections a major factor in the stabilisation and democratisation of emerging democracies and post-conflict societies but they have been increasingly included as a key aspect of negotiated peace agreements aimed at terminating civil wars (Lyons, 2005; Harbom et al., 2006; Hoddie and Hartzell, 2010) . In fact, elections have been central to virtually every negotiated settlement since the end of the Cold war and are now considered an essential requirement for internationally supported post-conflict state-building (Bjornlund, 2004; Bjornlund et al., 2007; Kelley, 2012) . Although both the timing and type of electoral system is open to some dispute, it has now generally accepted that the undertaking of fair and free elections -the 'bullets to ballots' approach -is vital for the transition to a democratic and peaceful society (Paris, 2004; Mansfield and Snyder, 2005; Reilly, 2008; Flores and Nooruddin, 2012) .
Yet, what we know about the long-term consequences of elections for the advancement of democracy and political stability in emerging democracies and postconflict societies is both contradictory and somewhat limited. While some studies point to their democratic enhancing qualities (Linberg, 2006) , particularly when combined with power-sharing and a negotiated peace settlement (Hoddie and Hartzell, 2005; Brancati and Synder, 2012) , others highlight their conflict-regenerating properties, most notably in the immediate aftermath of war (Paris, 2004) , while still others stress their long-term regressive tendencies, such as declining levels in turnout and the subsequent undermining of democracy (Fornos et al., 2004; Kostadinova and Power, 2007; O'Donnell and Schmitter, 2013) . Moreover, in the vast majority of cases, it is the influence of institutional factors -such as the electoral system -at the aggregate level which has been the focus of attention. By contrast, individual characteristics of ordinary citizens have rarely been investigated. This is particularly the case when the influence of gender is considered. Furthermore, the few studies that do exist tend to focus on the gender gap in electoral participation rather than differences between women (Inglehart and Norris, 2003; Coffe and Bolzendahl, 2011) .
The absence of such research may be considered surprising for the following reasons. First, it is now increasingly recognised that the political contribution of women is vital for the successful and peaceful transition of societies emerging from conflict. A view that has been repeatedly endorsed by the United Nations Security Council in a series of resolutions on Women and Peace and Security advocating women's full and equal participation in both the prevention and resolution of conflicts as well as in all areas of peacebuilding, including electoral processes and constitutional reform. 1 Second, it is important to note, however, as proponents of intersectionality suggest, 2 women do not form a politically monolithic group. As a number of studies have shown, not only are women divided by a range of factorssuch as class, race, age, and religion -in terms of their electoral turnout and party preferences in established Western democracies (Campbell, 2012; Huddy et al., 2008; Carroll, 2014; MacManus, 2014) but this is also the case in many post-conflict societies where women are often sharply differentiated both by long-standing ethnic loyalties as well as unequal access to resources (Waylen, 2007; Baur, 2009; Hassenstab and Ramet, 2015) . Not all political analysts, however, endorse this view, most notably when post-conflict societies in Africa are considered. As a number of scholars have noted, not only have many post-conflict African countries, particularly since the 1990s, seen major advancements in women's political representation but there is also evidence to suggest that these female representatives have sought alliances that cut across ethnic, religious and class differences to ensure the successful passage of legislative reforms concerning the rights of women (Arostegui, 2013; Tripp, 2015) .
It is with these considerations in mind that this study focuses on differences in electoral turnout among women in Northern Ireland. The article proceeds in two stages. First it focuses on the political participation of women in Northern Ireland, particularly in the post-accord period. Building on this analytical discussion and using nationally representative data from the 2015 Northern Ireland General Election Survey, 3 it examines differences between the two main religious groupings -Catholic and Protestant -in electoral turnout among women. Religious differences rather than differences in communal affiliation -nationalist versus unionist -were chosen as the primary distinguishing variable of interest because of the relatively large number of women -38.2 per cent in this instance -who were unwilling to endorse a nationalist or a unionist label, the majority of whom belonged to the Protestant tradition. 4 More importantly, however, and as in previous elections, religious background remained the primary determinant of voting during the 2015 Northern Ireland Westminster election (Tonge and Evans, 2015) . Moreover, in this instance, its influence was further reinforced by the introduction of unionist electoral pacts in four constituencies where, contrary to expectations, turnout actually increased by an average of 3.5 per cent. The use of Northern Ireland as a case study may be considered particularly appropriate for the following three reasons. First, the Northern Ireland peace accord, based on consociational power-sharing, is now considered an exemplar of conflict management throughout the world. Second, at least as far as these consociational power-sharing forms of governance are concerned, there is evidence to suggest that women are often ill-served by such arrangements, where gender equality and the political rights of women is often sacrificed in the interests of resolving communal identity (Byrne and McCulloch, 2012) . Finally, unlike previous studies which have focused on gender and peace settlements in countries transitioning to democracy, Northern Ireland offers a unique opportunity to investigate not only differences in electoral turnout among women but also in a society where they have been deeply divided by protracted ethno-national conflict.
Women, Political Participation and the Northern Ireland Agreement
Signed in April 1998, the Northern Ireland Agreement sought to bring to an end almost 30 years of violent conflict. Based on a consociational model of conflict regulation and the principle of 'parity in esteem', a key assumption of the Agreement was that long-standing and entrenched communal divisions could be accommodated and eventually ameliorated through institutional power-sharing arrangements. These power-sharing arrangements included the formation of a Northern Ireland Assembly with a power-sharing Executive, plus the introduction of a cross-community support principle for any major decisions taken by the Assembly (Hayes and McAllister, 2013 (Hayes and McAllister, 2012) . In fact, the inclusion of the formal recognition of the political rights of women in the final draft of the Agreement was both initiated and secured by the NIWC (Fearon, 1999) .
Despite these obligations and commitments, the post-Agreement period has not proved conducive for the advancement of women. As a number of scholars point out, not only have women been disproportionately negatively affected by the previously highly 'militarised nature' of Northern Ireland, such as the rise in domestic violence and the lack of reproductive rights, but the political arena in particular has remained a 'cold house' for women (Jarman, 2004; Galligan, 2013; Horgan and O'Connor, 2014) . Although female political representation has increased somewhat since 1998, it still remains low in comparison to Scotland and Wales 9 and, with the exception of the Italian regional legislatures, it is still the lowest in Western Europe for comparable devolved institutions (Potter, 2013 (Braniff and Whiting, 2015) .
There is also evidence to suggest that some of the main political parties have demonstrated a widespread lack of interest in promoting female participation and representation in politics (Matthews, 2014 (Braniff and Whiting, 2015) .
In summary, despite its promise of a new beginning, the post-Agreement period has proved to be an inhospitable place for women and this is particularly the case when the political arena is considered. In comparison to their male counterparts, political apathy among women remains widespread as does their greater lack of support for the new political arrangements and accompanying lower levels of trust in their political leaders (Gormley-Heenan and Devine, 2010; Hayes and McAllister, 2012) . Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that political disillusionment is more prevalent among women from within the unionist tradition, particularly when attitudes towards devolved government are considered, where female political representation continues to lag significantly behind that of their nationalist counterparts (Hayes and McAllister, 2012) . As a number of commentators have noted, although ethnic identity remains the dominant cleavage within this society, nationalist parties, for the most part, have a far better track-record in promoting gender policies, particularly the political representation of women, than that of their unionist counterparts (Matthews, 2014; Baniff and Whiting, 2015) .
Women and Electoral Turnout
A cornerstone of the 1998 Northern Ireland Agreement was the enhanced political participation of women. However, as noted earlier, much of the post-Agreement period has been characterised by an increase in female apathy and a lack of political representation and support for its political institutions. To what extent is this also the case when electoral participation is considered? Furthermore, are there any notable differences between women in relation to this issue? Table 1 [Insert Table 1 about here]
Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that this religious gap in greater electoral turnout among Catholic women is a relatively recent phenomenon which dates from 1998 onwards. As the data in Table 2 demonstrates, whereas electoral turnout was higher among Protestant women than Catholic women -82 per cent as compared to 75 per cent -during the 1992 election, by 1998, the pattern had reversed.
In 1998 [Insert Table 2] It is important to note, however, that this religious gap in turnout among women is not only greater than the religious gap among men but also than the gap in turnout between the two religious communities as a whole. As the data in Table 2 
Explaining Religious Differences in Female Electoral Turnout
There are several possible explanations as to why Protestant women are less likely to vote than Catholic women, the most obvious being there differing levels of support for devolved government. As noted earlier, it is this factor -a greater lack of support for the Northern Ireland Assembly and particularly for its power-sharing executivewhich not only accounts for the gender gap in levels of support for devolution within both religious communities but also for the greater lack of support among Protestant women as compared to their female Catholic counterparts (Hayes and McAllister, 2012) . The results in Table 3 Table 3 about here]
There is also evidence to suggest that this religious gap in level of female support has decreased overtime. This pattern holds regardless of whether support for the Assembly/Executive or attitudes towards power-sharing are considered. As the data in Table 4 [Insert Table 4 about here] A second possible explanation for the lack of Protestant female electoral engagement is their greater lack of party attachment and trust in political leaders.
However, previous research in relation to this issue is somewhat contradictory and mixed. While some studies find no notable differences among women in relation to both these issues (Gormley-Heenan and Devine, 2010), others suggest a differential effect with greater levels of political engagement among Catholic women but comparatively higher levels of trust in their political leaders among women within the Protestant community (Hayes and McAllister, 2012) .
The results in Table 5 It is important to note, however, that this female differential in trust between the two political leaders is a relatively recent phenomenon dating from the previous election. As the data in Table 6 demonstrates, while levels of trust in both political [Insert Table 7 about here]
The results lends some partial support to our hypothesis concerning the impact of both factors -attitudes towards political institutions and party support/trust in political leaders -on religious differences in female electoral turnout. As the data in Table 7 demonstrates, although religion has an independent and statistically significant effect on electoral turnout, an effect that remains when a range of socioeconomic control variables and national identity (Model 2) as well as attitudes towards the political institutions (Model 3) are included in the logistic regression analysis, these statistically significant differences no longer hold when party support and attitudes towards political leaders are also added to the investigation. Finally, when the influence of both party support and trust in political leaders is added to the analysis, religion is not a significant predictor of electoral turnout (see Model 4). Rather the key net predictors of electoral turnout in this instance are both partisanship and trust in political leaders. Whereas women who had a party attachment were almost eight times more likely -the odds ratios is 7.54 -to turn out to vote than those who did not, women who claimed to have trust in the two main political leaders -Peter Robinson and Martin McGuinness -were nearly four times more likely to do so than those who did not. This is not to discount, however, the continuing independent and positive net effect of support for the Assembly.
However, at least as far as religious differences in female electoral participation in Northern Ireland is concerned, the results suggest that it is the addition of these two factors -party attachment and trust in political leaders -which explains the religion gap in voting behaviour among women. Once these two factors are included in the analysis, religion is no longer a significant net predictor of electoral participation among women. In other words and in comparison to their female Catholic counterparts, it is their greater political disengagement, both in terms of their party attachment and their trust in political leaders, which accounts for the significantly lower electoral participation rates among Protestant women in this instance.
Conclusion
Over the last few decades, the role of elections and electoral turnout in and coincide with the first assembly elections based on the consociational powersharing arrangements. Third, this religious gap in turnout among women is not only greater than the religious gap among men but also than the gap in turnout between the two religious communities as a whole. Fourth, while only future research can determine the extent to which this female gap in turnout between the two communities continues for the foreseeable future, particularly in the light of diminishing turnout among the nationalist community and the increasing political representation of unionist women, the notable size of the gap suggests that it will remain for some time to come. Thus, contrary to the gender-blind assertions of consociational theorists, mechanisms to deal with the democratic deficit among Protestant women, or their much higher rates of abstention, must now lie at the very heart of Northern Ireland's politics, including its consociational power-sharing arrangements.
Our results also confirm the importance of two key factors in consociational power-sharing arrangements -party attachment and trust in their political leaders -in accounting for the religious gap in turnout among women. More so than any other issue, it was the greater antipathy among Protestant women towards the primary political agents involved in the electoral process -political parties and their leaderswhich accounted for their higher rates of abstention. Again, there is evidence to suggest that this antipathy among Protestant women in terms of their political attachments is a relatively recent phenomenon dating from the turn of the century.
What may account for these findings? One explanation is the differing responses of the parties and their leaders to the political role of women. As noted earlier, although ethnic divisions eclipse all other cleavages within this society, nationalist parties have been much more proactive in promoting gender policies, particularly the political representation of women, than that of their unionist counterparts. Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that this lack of female political representation is it odds with the preferences of the female Protestant population at large (Baniff and Whiting, 2015) . This is not to deny, however, the potential ability of consociational powersharing arrangements to accommodate female political participation and gender equality more generally. As Byrne and McCullock (2012: 566) point out: 'there is nothing inherent in power-sharing that cannot be made more democratic and inclusive of women.' However, the willingness and ability of political parties and their leaders to address this female representation issue and mobilise the electorate around such cross-cutting allegiances, including gender equality, will not be an easy task (Kennedy et al., 2016) . Given the current dominance of ethno-nationalism as the singular mark of division within the formal political structures and the use of the ballot box as the sole measure of political legitimacy, both a major revision of the underlying political arrangements and the introduction of mechanisms to actively promote the inclusion and participation of women are needed. However, as Byrne and McCullough (2012) also point out, such revisions and mechanisms to both accommodate and increase female political representation and participation will not be enough. As a number of commentators have also noted, what is further required is much greater attention to the gendered nature of the conflict, including the reproduction of patriarchal privilege in consociational post-conflict political institutions and their power-sharing practices (Galligan, 2006 (Galligan, , 2013 Byrne and McCullock, 2013; Kennedy et al., 2016) .
These results have a number of implications for other societies emerging any statutory powers (Hoewer, 2013) . there is some evidence to suggest that, since the ratification of resolution 1325 in 2000, peace agreements are more likely to contain specific references to women, they still only account for 16 per cent of all peace agreements (Bell and O'Rourke, 2010) .
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Founded in 1996 to contest the elections to the Northern Ireland Forum -the multiparty talks which led to the Northern Ireland Agreement -the NIWC was a cross-communal and women-only political party established to represent the interests of women in the negotiations. 
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While part of this notable rise in voting apathy among Protestant males in 2011
could be attributed to an extremely divisive and lack lustre election campaign by unionist politicians, particularly among those from within the UUP (Matthews, 2011) , this is not to discount the overall downward trend in turnout within the Protestant/unionist community, a pattern which is now replicated within the Catholic/nationalist population (Russell, 2016) . 
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Alternative analysis based on OLS with robust standard errors gave rise to an identical finding. An identical result emerged when the combined effect of religion and communal affiliation, or Catholic-Nationalist women, were used as the distinguishing category for investigation. Sources: 1992 Sources: , 1998 Sources: , 2003 Sources: , 2011 Sources: and 2015 Northern Ireland Election Surveys. 
Questions: And in terms of the current political arrangements, can you please tell me how you feel about the following: The Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive; The requirement that Unionists and Nationalists share power. Questions: Generally speaking do you think of yourself as a supporter of any political party? Do you think of yourself as closer to one party in Northern Ireland than to others? ; On a scale of 0-10, where 0 means complete distrust in a leader and 10 means complete trust, please rate these leaders. Note: Trust in leaders is scored over 6 on the 0-10 scale.
Source: Northern Ireland General Election Survey, 2015 
